Intracellular bacteria were recently shown to employ eukaryotic prenylation system for modifying activity and ensuring proper intracellular localization of their own proteins. Following the same logic, the proteins of viruses may also serve as prenylation substrates. Using extensively validated high-confidence prenylation predictions by PrePS with a cut-off for experimentally confirmed farnesylation of hepatitis delta virus antigen, we compiled in silico evidence for several new prenylation candidates, including IRL9 and few other proteins encoded by Herpesviridae, Nef, E1A, NS5A, PB2, HN, L83L, (...) MC155R, other Poxviridae proteins, and some bacteriophages of human associated bacteria. If confirmed experimentally, these findings may aid in dissection of molecular functions of uncharacterized viral proteins and provide a novel rationale for statin and FT/GGT1-based inhibition of viral infections. Prenylation of bacteriophage proteins may aid in moderation of microbial infections. Many human viruses, including HCV, HIV1, ASFV, and a number of Adeno-, Pox-, and herpesviruses, including CMV, encode the substrates for mammalian prenylation enzymes. Prenylation is advantageous for viral infection; its suppression by FT/GGT and FPPS inhibitors has antiviral effects. In bacteriophages, prenylation may aid in moderation of microbial infections. (shrink)

Straipsnyje svarstomas teorinis judesys, kuriuo Emmanuelis Levinas grindë savàjà asmens tapatumosampratà, prieðingà Vakarø filosofijos klasikiniame racionalizme ir fenomenologijoje susiklosèiusiossavimonës kaip sàmonës tapatumo sau prielaidai. Kanto asmens tapatumo koncepcija taip pat liekaðioje „antileviniðkoje“ paradigmoje, taèiau Levinas pasitelkia ketvirtàjà Kanto antinomijà kaip iðlaisvinanèià subjektyvumà ið laiko spàstø. Straipsnyje keliamas klausimas, kaip Levinas perðoka nuo dinamiðko laiko sekmens problemos prie subjekto tapatumo kaip jo socialumo klausimo. Koká vaidmenáðioje naujoje asmens tapatumo sampratoje vaidina Fiodoro Dostojevskio romanø kai kuriø veikëjøvertybinëms prielaidoms labai artima Levino subjekto (...) pasyvumo, paþeidþiamumo ir apsëstumo samprata? Kaip ji iðplaukia ið ketvirtosios Kanto antinomijos pamokø? Vieniðas filosofinis subjektas negalikito momento kitybës aptikti pats savyje. Levino filosofinis subjektas kito momento kitybæ randa kitame asmenyje. Taip laikas sukuriamas. Levinas, susiedamas asmens tapatumà su nauja laiko samprata,suteikia jam socialumo matmená. Autorë straipsnyje árodinëja tezæ, kad Levino subjekto tapatumosteigèiai didþiausià átakà turëjo Dostojevskio romanuose suformuluota þmogiðkosios brolybës samprata. Jos paveiktas Levinas formuluoja naujà asmens tapatumo savimonæ, todël jo filosofijoje pasyvusapsëstasis kitu subjektas yra amþinas Odisëjas, niekada nebegráþtantis pats á save ir nebesutampantissu savimi. Toks teorinis judesys, autorës manymu, tampa galimas, kai Levinas, sekdamas Kanto ketvirtàja antinomija, savo subjektà iðlaisvina ið dinaminës laiko tëkmës panèiø.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: ketvirtoji Kanto antinomija, Levinas, Dostojevskis, subjekto tapatumas. (shrink)

This article is based on the presupposition that postmodern philosophy has been largely influenced by Nietzsche's writings. The author raises the question of how Nietzsche and postmodern philosophy are interpreted in the contemporary philosophical discourse in Lithuania. The conclusion drawn is that many philosophy critics in Lithuania are interested in Nietzsche's philosophy (Mickevižius, Sodeika, Šerpytytè, Sverdiolas, Baranova) and in the problems of postmodern philosophy (Keršytè, Rubavižius, Žukauskaité, Serpytytè, Šverdiolas, Baranova, Norkus). The article also raises a second crucial question: (...) beyond the critics, are there any truly authentic postmodern thinkers in Lithuania? This article's main hypotheses is that Arvydas Šliogeris' philosophy is the best and perhaps the only example of original Lithuanian postmodern thought; it is based on, and interconnected with, the deeply inherited roots of existential thought in Lithuanian philosophical culture. The arguments for these hypotheses are as follows: first, Šliogeris is the first philosopher in Lithuania who has tried to reason in an interdisciplinary manner, e. g. trying to overcome the modernistic distinction between philosophy and the arts (especially literature, poetry, and the visual arts); secondly, Šliogeris's philosophizing is indispensable to his writings— his texts are examples of an experience of writing as thinking and thinking as writing; thirdly, following Deleuze's presupposition that the philosopher is a creator, one can see this creative aspect in Šliogeris's approach. His texts show how it is possible to synthesize insights from philosophy and poetry. (shrink)

The article starts with the question: how is the political philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche even possible? The author discusses with Tracy B. Strong’s presumption that Nietzsche’s political philosophy is not possible as a transcendental deduction. The author supposes that this type of question clashes with the premises of Nietzsche’s thinking and also undermines the interpretation of the other aspects of his philosophy. First of all: the question of nazification and denazification of Nietzsche’s thought. The article comes to the conclusion that (...) in the scope of recent investigation there is not much sense in raising the question whether Nietzsche’s political views are political philosophy in the normative meaning of the term, but it is possible to discuss the question of political anthropology as the psychology of the nations Nietzsche was really interested in. (shrink)

Straipsnyje svarstoma ðiuolaikinës normatyviosios etikos paieðkos galimybë, pasitelkiant Karlo Otto Apeliotokio bandymo pavyzdá ir suprieðinant já su Jürgeno Habermaso diskurso etika bei Maxo Weberio irKarlo Raimundo Popperio politinës moralës projektais. Autorë pripaþásta, kad Apelio pastangos suteiktiðiuolaikinei etikai vieningà normatyviná pagrindà iðkrenta ið bendros á vertybiø pliuralizmà linkstanèiosðiuolaikinës etikos perspektyvos. Kita vertus, jos manymu, siekiant iðsaugoti Kanto etikos formaliuosiusaspektus, jo transcendentalines intencijas, galima nepastebëti svarbiø Kanto etikos turinio aspektø.Mûsø galva, formalus procedûriðkumas ar normatyvumas neiðsemia Kanto etikos galimybiø.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: Apelis, Weberis, Popperis, (...) ðiuolaikinë normatyvioji etika, moralë ir politika. (shrink)

Ðio straipsnio pavadinime uþkoduota ir tyrimo problema. Èia bus svarstomas filosofijos ir literatûrossuartëjimo prieigø dekonstrukcinis tyrimas Jacques Derrida postfilosofijoje. Kantas simbolizuoja klasikinæ filosofo, Kafka – literato laikysenà. Taèiau tai tik straipsnio autorës iðmonë. Bus atsispirta nuo to,kaip Derrida perskaito Kafkos parabolæ Prieð ástatymà romane Procesas. Autorë pripaþins, kad ið tiesøsodieèio kaip kantininko ir durininko kaip paties Derrida suprieðinimas leidþia geriau suvokti Derridaiðrastos sàvokos différance konotacijas. Kita vertus, taip suprasta skirtis iðveda á singuliarumo, paraðo,paslapties sàvokø judëjimà Derrida tekstuose. Taèiau lieka neaiðku, (...) ar ið tiesø Derrida neprieðtaraujasavo teiginiui, kad raðymas vyksta anapus filosofijos ir literatûros, kai prieina prie iðvados, kad sodietis--kantininkas negalëjo suprasti jam skirto áëjimo singuliarumo, nes turëjo problemø su literatûra. Ar taireiðkia, kad literatûra, skirtingai nei filosofija, lieka atvira paslapèiai ir neþinojimui? O filosofija tampasusijusi su þinojimu ir paslapties áminimu? Autorës nuomone, paties Derrida hermeneutikos dekonstrukcija knygoje Pentinai: Nietzsche’s stiliai tokiai iðvadai prieðtarautø.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: differénce, Derrida, Kafka, sodietis-kantininkas, filosofija ir literatûra. (shrink)

The transition to a low carbon economy demands new strategies to enable organizations to take advantage of the potential for “green” growth. An organization's environmental stakeholders can provide opportunities for growth and support the success of its low carbon strategies, as well as potentially acting as a constraint on new initiatives. Building environmental capabilities through engagement with environmental stakeholders is conceptualized as an important aspect for the success of organizational low carbon strategies. We examine capability building across a range of (...) sectors affected by the sustainability agenda, including construction, rail, water, and health care. We identify a number of emergent environmental stakeholders and explore their engagement with the development of environmental capabilities in the context of the transition toward a low carbon economy. Our conceptual framework offers a categorization of environmental stakeholders based on their position in relation to a focal organization and the potential for the development of environmental capabilities. (shrink)

This article concentrates on two main interpreta- tions of Friedrich Nietzshe's philosophy: hermeneuti- cal , originated in Martin Heidegger's book "Nietzsche" and deconstnlctive -, elaborated in Jacques Derrida's book "Esperon: Le Styles de Nietzsche. Spurs. Nietzshe's Styles".and his article "Interpreting Signatures : Two Questions". The author of the article considers that the idea of in- verted platonism as a main paradigm of Nietzsche's thought is original Heidegger's idea, underlying his interpretation of Nietzsche as a last methaphysisian in Western thought. Derrida, (...) interpreting the same one page fragment "History of an Error" from Nietzche's work "Twilight o f the Idols" opposed Heidegger's intention to unite the diversity o f Nietzsche's thought into one paradigmatic schema. Author of the article considers, that his deconstructive efforts clearly exposed, that Heidegger's interpetation neglecting the pliuralistic diversity of Nietzsche's philosophys is influenced more by his longing for axi- omatic unity common to methaphysical thought than by original Nietzsche's thinking. Raktiniai iodiiai: Platonizmas, ~pvertiina.~, pa- skutinis nzetapzikas, Nietzsclze b stilius. (shrink)

In his Prince of Networks, Graham Harman reconstructs Latourian critique of concepts of potentiality and virtuality with which he claims to agree. This seems striking because Latour’s arguments seem to be exactly those Harman rejects in his other writings as overmining. Furthermore, this critique of potentiality and virtuality creates a dividing line between Harman and Bryant’s Democracy of Objects, where the concept of virtual plays a central role. In this article, I will explore this debate, focusing on how the concept (...) of virtuality works in the context of the ontological realism that Object-Oriented Ontology is. To do this, I will first present Bryant’s notion of virtuality focusing on the problem of the individuality of the object. Then I will explore Latourian–Harmanian arguments against virtuality and show that the main issue Harman has with virtuality has to do with the agency of objects. Therefore, I claim that the main dividing line between Bryant’s and Harman’s versions of Object-Oriented Ontology is the difference between the two notions of agency. (shrink)

Šiame straipsnyje siekiama atsakyti į klausimą, kas galėtų susieti filosofiją ir vizualiuosius bei žodinius menus. Ar įmanoma ir jei taip, tai kaip įmanoma reflektuoti visus menus kaip vieno kūrybinio įvykio momentus? Siekiant atsakyti į šį klausimą, pirma, aptariamas logikos ir kūrybiškumo susikertant menui ir filosofijai susidūrimas, antra – žodžio ir vaizdo nebendramatiškumas, surastas / išrastas belgų siurrealisto René Magritte’o ir reflektuotas Michelio Foucault. Čia sugrįžtama prie klasikinio F. Niezsche’s disputo su Sokratu apie logikos ir kūrybiškumo priešpriešą ir siekiama atsakyti į (...) klausimą, kurią pusę – Sokrato ar F. Nietzsche’s – paremia šioje diskusijoje Gilles’is Deleuze’as ir Félixas Guattari. Atrodytų, kad jie suderina logiką ir kūrybiškumą, pastebėdami, kad menas nėra nei mokslinio mąstymo, nei filosofijos koreliatas ar papildas, kad trys minties formos – menas, mokslas ir filosofija – turi po nepriklausomą specifinę kryptį, Kita vertus, interpretuodamas I. Kantą, G. Deleuze’as pastebi disharmoniją tarp vaizduotės, supratimo ir proto, ir, sekdamas Antonino Artaud’o įžvalgomis, jis išskiria naują minties tipą kaip tarpinę teritoriją tarp žodžio ir vaizdo. (shrink)

Deleuze and Beckett. S. E. Wilmer and A. Žukauskaitė, Eds. Palgrave Macmillan; 2015. 253 p. ISBN -10: 1137481137.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Art's DetourA Clash of Aesthetic TheoriesS. K. Wertz (bio)Both John Dewey1 and Martin Heidegger2 thought that art's audience had to take a detour in order to appreciate or understand a work of art. They wrote about this around the same time (mid-1930s) and independently of one another, so this similar circumstance in the history of aesthetics is unusual since they come from very different philosophical traditions. What was it (...) about the climate of the times that led them to such an idea? Is it still viable today? Both philosophers thought that art's audience is not in a position to immediately appreciate works of art—that we are missing something for a direct appreciation or apprehension—so we must take a detour. Why the detours and what are they? Are the detours similar? And are Dewey and Heidegger right about this? The essay that unfolds below attempts to answer these questions.First a definition is in order so we know what the term "detour" means when I use it. What is a detour? It is a deviation from a direct course or the usual procedure; a roundabout way temporarily replacing part of a route; in other words, a bypass or a roundabout way to some destination. The Little Oxford Dictionary adds a different twist on my characterization: "a course that leaves and rejoins [the] direct route."3 Applying this idea to art, we can say that a detour describes an audience who ordinarily perceives an artwork is a legitimate beginning for an appreciation of it, but that course must be bypassed for another (conception) before it can rejoin the direct route (perception). In other words, perceptions in the aesthetic experience must be aided by conceptions—a decidedly Kantian stance taken by Dewey and Heidegger. Their illustrations make my interpretation plausible.One of Heidegger's examples is Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant boots.4 He selects this painting to illustrate his metaphysics, which centers around the notion of "equipment." Peasant boots are equipment in [End Page 100] the sense that they are worn or used; the mere thing (like shoes or boots in a store [exhibited] or a closet [in storage]) disappears in use and becomes equipment. Between equipment and mere things—these two categories of being—are artworks. They are pictorial representations of equipment (in Heidegger's illustration; a pair of shoes as mere things could be a pictorial representation, like an advertisement, but it wouldn't be the same). Through the painted boots, a world comes into focus—a network of meaning. The world Heidegger sees in the Van Gogh painting is captured in the following descriptions: "In the vicinity of the [art]work we were suddenly somewhere else than we usually tend to be…. The art work let us know what shoes are in truth" (ATCR 233). So the nature of art is still a question about the nature of representation for Heidegger: it is what the shoes disclose to us about human existence. As he says, it is not just merely a pair of shoes portrayed but shoes "from the dark opening of the worn insides … the toilsome tread of the worker stares forth" (ATCR 232). In other words, we see the difficult labor that this particular owner toiled with in her daily chores.In Tralbaut's book, he quotes Heidegger in a caption alongside the painting: "Engraving in the intimate obscurity of the hollow of a boot is the weariness of the steps of work. The rough and solid weight of the clog tells of the slow and obstinate trudge across the fields."5 Heidegger continues in the same vein:In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles slides the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of... (shrink)

This paper is a technical study of the systematic observations and computations made by Muḥyī al-Dīn al-Maghribī (d. 1283) at the Maragha observatory (north-western Iran, c. 1259–1320) in order to newly determine the parameters of the Ptolemaic lunar model, as explained in his Talkhīṣ al-majisṭī, “Compendium of the Almagest.” He used three lunar eclipses on March 7, 1262, April 7, 1270, and January 24, 1274, in order to measure the lunar epicycle radius and mean motions; an observation on April 20, (...) 1264, to determine the lunar eccentricity; an observation on August 29, 1264, to test the model; and another on March 15, 1262, for measuring the lunar parallax. In the second period of activity at the Maragha observatory, Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad al-Wābkanawī (c. 1254–1320) adopted all of al-Maghribī’s parameter values in his Zīj, but decreased his value for the mean longitude of the moon at epoch by 0;13,11∘\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$^{\circ }$$\end{document}. By comparing the times of the new moons and lunar eclipses in the period of 1270–1320 as computed from the astronomical tables of the Maragha tradition with the true modern ones, it is argued that this correction was very probably the result of actual observations. (shrink)

Śaṅkarācārya's commentary with supercommentary on Catuḥsūtra of Brahmasūtra.

This is a comment to Graham Harman’s 2019 response to an article by Þóra Pétursdóttir and Bjørnar Olsen (2018) in which they propose that a materially grounded, archaeological perspective might complement Harman’s historical approach in Immaterialism (2016). Harman responds that his book is indeed already more archaeological than historical, stipulating that history is the study of media with a high density of information, whereas archaeology studies media with a low density of information. History, Harman holds, ends up in too much (...) detail, while archaeology has the advantage of lending itself to the imagination. Hence, his reading of history had the aim of tempering the historical information overload, in effect making the book a work of archaeology. In this comment, I want to do three things: (1) critique the idea that archaeological and historical media are inherently different with regard to their densities of information, (2) discuss how archaeology and history approach their media, and (3) reflect on conceptualisations of “archaeology” outside the discipline itself. (shrink)

Søren Kierkegaards komplekse livssyn, værker og filosofi udfoldes og præsenteres som noget, der stadig er relevant for det moderne menneskes selvopfattelse. Indsigtsfuld bog, som både kan læses af nye og erfarne læsere af Søren Kierkegaards forfatterskab.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME'S BUNDLES, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND KANT Even if we are inclined to view Hume's attempt to explain ascriptions of personal identity as an abysmal failure, we might still be sympathetic toward his proposal to replace the going substance theory of the nature of mind with his bundle account. Thus we might fault Hume for erecting an unachievably high standard for personal identity, or round on him for excluding bodily criteria (...) 2... from his solution, but nonetheless applaud his spiriting away of the Cartesian soul substance leaving his "true idea of the human mind" (261) as a collection of perceptions in its stead. However, Hume's concern to give an account of the idea of the unity of a human mind in terms of related perceptions has run into notoriously rough sledding, not the least of which is the fact that Hume himself in his Appendix to "Of Personal Identity" seems to abandon his bundle theory in despair. In this paper I shall first be concerned to examine the criticism of his bundle theory which Hume brings forth in the Appendix and explain why I think the core difficulty remains insoluble for Hume. I shall then go on to suggest that the unworkability of Húmete bundle theory is directly tied to his failure to appreciate certain features of the peculiarly first person nature of his question about the make-up of minds. In thus emphasizing the place of the first person voice in my interpretation I am stealing a leaf, if not a chapter, from Kant. But this is as it should be since one of the aims of this essay is to provide an interpretation of Hume's difficulties with his account of the nature of mind which explains part of the reason why 'self-consciousness' (or 'apperception') looms so very large in the Critique of Pure Reason attack upon Hume's type of bundle theory. 60. 1. Hume's Second Thoughts In a burst of self criticism at the Appendix to the section on personal identity, Hume brings forth this objection to his own efforts:...Having thus loosen' d all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have indue' d me to receive it (635). After additional reflections Hume encapsulates his objection thus:...All my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness (6SS-6). What is the defect Hume calls to our attention? Notice first that the footnote on page 635 explicitly refers us back to that part of his account Hume considers defective; and when we look back to the text of the Treatise in question, page 260, we find it is precisely there that Hume uses the analogy of a republic to sketch his bundle theory of the unity of mind in terms of the two associative principles, resemblance and causation. So it must somehow be that this account in terms of the associative principles is mistaken. But what then is the mistake? According to Hume it is that he cannot 'explain' the principles which unite the discrete percepts. Now it seems to me there are only two possible things Hume could mean in saying this. He could mean either (1) that the principles which connect the percepts of one mind are instances of the associative principles, but he cannot explain them; or (2) there must be other, non-associative, principles which connect the percepts of a single mind and these he cannot explain. 61. I think we can safely conclude (1) cannot represent Hume's misgivings when he says he is unable to explain the uniting principles of the mental bundles. There is first the fact that he does not call into question his general programme of accounting for the nature of the unity of complex things by the principles of causation, resemblance and contiguity — for example, ships, plants, animals, houses and rivers (e.g. 257f) — but only his... (shrink)

Introduktion ; Titelblad og værkopbygning (Når man har ord for forordet ; Man må finde ord for udgivelsens betydning ; Om bogen, som man ikke har læst et ord af ; Der er ord for alle pengene ; Forordet er der ikke mange ord for ; Det er vigtigt at komme med ord for in vino veritas ; Ord for opbyggelse ; Der bliver ord for sjælens stemning ; Man vil have en del ord for forventning og hensigt med en (...) bog) ; Efterskrift ; Afslutning (Biografisk tidstavle ; Værkoversigt ; Pseudonymoversigt ; Begrebsoversigt). (shrink)

In examining Ennead VI 4[22], we find Plotinus in conflict with modern, i.e., Cartesian or Kantian, assumptions about the relation of soul and body and the identification of the self with the subject. Curiously, his images and exposition are more in tune with Twentieth Century notions such as wave and field. With these as keys, we are in a position to unlock the subtlety of Plotinus' analysis of the way soul and body are present together, with sensation structured through the (...) body and judgment coming from the soul. The problem of the self concerns not only the unity of the self in terms of body and soul, but also how the self is constituted in relation to other selves, both keeping its individuality and sharing its experiences at the same time. (shrink)

On educational philosophy in Puranas, Hindu mythological classics.

Supercommentary on Praśastapādabhāṣya of Praśastapādācārya, commemtary on Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda, compendium of Vaiśeṣika philosophy.

Comparative and philosophical study of the Sāṅkhyasūtra of Kapila and Carakasaṃhitā of Caraka.

Work with commentary on self in Hinduism and Hindu philosophy.

While outcomes for children with T-cell acute lymphoblastic leukemia have improved dramatically, survival rates for patients with relapsed/refractory disease remain dismal. Prior studies indicate that glucocorticoid resistance is more common than resistance to other chemotherapies at relapse. In addition, failure to clear peripheral blasts during a prednisone prophase correlates with an elevated risk of relapse in newly diagnosed patients. Here we show that intrinsic GC resistance is present at diagnosis in early thymic precursor T-ALLs as well as in a subset (...) of non-ETP T-ALLs. GC-resistant non-ETP T-ALLs are characterized by strong induction of JAK/STAT signaling in response to interleukin-7 stimulation. Removing IL7 or inhibiting JAK/STAT signaling sensitizes these T-ALLs, and a subset of ETP T-ALLs, to GCs. The combination of the GC dexamethasone and the JAK1/2 inhibitor ruxolitinib altered the balance between pro- and anti-apoptotic factors in samples with IL7-dependent GC resistance, but not in samples with IL7-independent GC resistance. Together, these data suggest that the addition of ruxolitinib or other inhibitors of IL7 receptor/JAK/STAT signaling may enhance the efficacy of GCs in a biologically defined subset of T-ALL.Leukemia advance online publication, 30 May 2017; doi:10.1038/leu.2017.136. (shrink)

In verse twelve of the Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu makes a curious claim about the five flavors; namely that they cause people not to taste or that they jade the palate. The five flavors are: sweet, sour, salt, bitter and spicy or hot as in 'heat'. To the Western mind, the claim, 'The five flavors cause them [persons] to not taste,' is counterintuitive; on the contrary, the presence of the five flavors in a dish or in a meal would (...) expand or enhance the senses and the palate, i.e., taste would be augmented by the five flavors. So what is the plausible meaning of the Taoistic claim? To answer this question, I look very briefly at the history of the doctrine of the five flavors and the history of Chinese cuisine. Lao Tzu probably has Confucian feasts in mind in making such a claim, but other interpretations are discussed. (shrink)